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NOTE 
INCOME, TAXES AND THE CONSTITUTION:  
WHY THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS  
GOT IT RIGHT IN MURPHY 
Russell F. Romond∗
In August 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) struck down an income tax statute on 
constitutional grounds—the first time in over eight decades that any 
court has taken such action.1  In Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service 
(“Murphy”), the D.C. Circuit held § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue 
Code (the “Code”) unconstitutional because it excluded from gross 
income awards for compensatory damages on account of physical 
personal injuries, but included awards for such damages on account of 
nonphysical personal injuries.2  The decision was widely criticized by 
academics and tax professionals, particularly with respect to the D.C. 
Circuit’s misconceptions regarding the constitutional source of 
Congress’s taxation power, and many commentators wrote at length 
about the “parade of horribles” that would inevitably result if the 
decision were allowed to stand.3
 ∗ J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.S., Fordham 
College of Business Administration, 1999.  I would like to thank Professor Jeffrey M. 
Colón of Fordham University School of Law for his thoughtful insight and advice, as 
well as the members of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their 
diligent editorial assistance. 
 1. In 1920, the Supreme Court struck down a statute taxing stock dividends as 
income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).  However, in 1972, the Tenth 
Circuit cited constitutional grounds to expand the application of a statutory tax 
exemption in Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 2. 460 F.3d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, Murphy v. IRS, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. 
Cir. Dec 22, 2006). 
 3. Professor Paul Caron, of the University of Cincinnati College of Law, said of 
Murphy, “It is difficult to overstate the importance and potential harm of this decision.” 
Ryan J. Donmoyer, Tax Law Ruling by Court May Encourage New Challenges (Aug. 
23, 2006), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=az 
SsFNBVDjJ8&refer=us.  See also Paul Caron, Tax Prof Commentary on Murphy, (Aug. 
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Murphy warrants controversy.  Historically, courts have deferred to 
legislatures with respect to economic and regulatory legislation, 
especially where such legislation involves “complex tax laws.”4  The 
IRS promptly filed a petition for a rehearing en banc, but the D.C. 
Circuit ultimately dismissed the petition as moot.5  In a surprising move, 
the original three-judge panel vacated its decision on its own motion and 
scheduled a rehearing of the case.6  As of this writing, the ultimate 
outcome of the case is unknown.  However, the panel’s original opinion 
in Murphy, though vacated, merits discussion because there the court 
asked a question that goes to the very foundation of our income tax laws, 
namely: “What does the government tax when it purports to tax 
income?” 
This article will attempt to answer that question.  Part I of this 
article will briefly summarize the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Murphy and 
present the issues raised by the decision.  Part II will analyze the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion and argue that the court ultimately decided Murphy 
correctly, despite some errors in its analysis.  This Part will then develop 
a rule for courts to apply to determine whether a transaction results in an 
“accession to wealth” within the framework provided by the Supreme 
Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,7 and revisit Murphy 
within the context of this rule.8  This Part will demonstrate that 
Congress designed the income tax to operate as a tax on net incomes, 
and not on gross receipts. 
Part III will examine and refute the claim that Murphy would 
undermine the very foundation of the income tax and consequently 
prohibit the taxation of wages.  This Part will first address the most 
common arguments made by “tax protestors”—taxpayers who cite 
various constitutional objections to paying income taxes—and explain 
why Murphy adds nothing to their arguments.  Part III will next apply 
23, 2006), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2006/08/tax_prof_ 
commen.html. 
 4. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (“In structuring internal taxation 
schemes the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which 
in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.”). 
 5. Order Dismissing Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, No. 05-5139 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
 6. Order for Reh’g, No. 05-5139 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
 7. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 8. This rule is referred to as the “accession to wealth” rule, discussed infra notes 
116-29. 
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the accession to wealth rule to examine how Congress taxes wages 
under the income tax.  While it is universally recognized that wages are 
a source of gross income under § 61(a) of the Code,9 the Court has never 
actually held whether wages—in their entirety—are gains or receipts to 
the taxpayer.  Part III will explore whether the entirety of wages 
represent gain to the taxpayer, as opposed to merely receipts, and then 
explain the tax consequences of this distinction by comparing how the 
Code treats wages compared to transactions in property and income 
from a trade or business.  Part III concludes by suggesting that the 
current income tax on wages operates similar to a graduated “sales” tax 
to the wage earner, and proposes that Congress amend the Code to 
provide wage earners a method to calculate their gains derived from 
wages to report as gross income. 
Part IV will argue that Congress should adopt a “wage expenditure 
basis” to calculate the proportion of wages that constitutes gross income 
to wage earners.  This Part proposes a formula for calculating this basis, 
expressed as follows: 
 
BB
 
we = [P + T + (Emw * 92.35%)]10
 
According to this formula, the wage gains accruing to the wage 
earner are the net wages remaining after adjusting for payroll and state 
income taxes, as well as an adjusted minimum wage payable for an 
equivalent quantity of labor.  This methodology provides three 
advantages over the way the Code currently taxes wages.  First, a wage 
expenditure basis is equitable because it brings wages, as a source of 
income, into parity with capital gains and income from a trade or 
business, both of which incorporate the notion of “gain” by adjusting for 
the costs of production of income.  Second, it would enhance the 
progressive nature of the current tax structure and provide tax relief to 
low income workers and two-earner families.  Finally, it is relatively 
easy to implement and leaves intact the other provisions of the Code that 
provide credits, deductions and exemptions for dependents and personal 
expenses. 
 9. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000). 
 10. Where: 
   Bwe  = Wage expenditure basis; 
   P     = Payroll taxes; 
   T     = State and local income taxes withheld; and 
   Emw = Minimum wage equivalent for the amount of labor performed. 
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I.  MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
A.  Background 
Marrita Murphy filed a claim with the Department of Labor 
alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation by her former 
employer.11  An administrative law judge awarded Murphy $70,000 in 
compensatory damages, $45,000 of which was for “emotional distress or 
mental anguish” and $25,000 of which was for “injury to professional 
reputation.”12  Murphy included her award as “gross income” on her 
2000 tax return and paid $20,665 in taxes.13
Murphy later filed an amended return with the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) seeking a tax refund for this payment.14  After the IRS 
denied Murphy’s request, she filed suit in federal court.15  The district 
court ruled against her and Murphy appealed to the D.C. Circuit.16  In 
her complaint, Murphy first claimed that she was entitled to a refund 
under § 104(a)(2) of the Code because her award compensated for 
physical injuries, and thus should have been excluded from gross 
income.17  Murphy alternatively claimed that § 104(a)(2) was 
unconstitutional as applied to her award because her damages were 
compensatory and thus not “income” within the meaning of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.18  The court rejected Murphy’s first claim on the 
merits.19  Their ruling on her second claim is the basis for this article. 
In her second claim, Murphy argued that her award was neither a 
gain nor an accession to wealth, but instead a return of “human capital” 
and thus not income.20  According to this human capital theory, “a 
damage award for personal injuries—including nonphysical injuries—is 
not income but simply return of capital—‘human capital.’”21  Murphy 
 
 11. See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 82. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among 
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”). 
 19. See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84. 
 20. Id. at 85. 
 21. Id. 
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cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass Co., a 1918 Attorney General Opinion (“1918 Opinion”), a 1918 
revenue ruling (“1918 Ruling”), and a House Report on the Revenue Act 
of 1918 (“1918 House Report”) in support of her argument.22  In 
Glenshaw Glass, the Court recognized the “long history of . . . holding 
personal injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly 
correspond to a return of capital” when it distinguished punitive 
damages from compensatory damages as a source of taxable income.23  
Similarly, the 1918 Opinion stated that proceeds from an accident 
insurance policy are capital, as distinguished from income, because they 
“merely take the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed 
by the accident.”24  The 1918 Ruling made the same conclusion with 
respect to damages or settlement awards received for accident injuries.25  
The 1918 House Report also expressed doubt as to whether 
compensatory damages would be required to be included in gross 
income.26  Murphy argued that compensatory damages of this sort were 
commonly understood to be excluded from income at the time the 
Sixteenth Amendment was ratified.27
The Government responded with several arguments.  First, it 
invoked the presumption that “Congress enacts laws within its 
constitutional limits.”28  Second, it asserted that Congress could, at its 
discretion, repeal § 104(a)(2) in its entirety and constitutionally tax all 
compensatory damages.29  Third, it argued that the Court’s discussion of 
“human capital” in footnote eight of Glenshaw Glass referred only to a 
since-abandoned congressional policy.30  Finally, they dismissed 
Murphy’s “human capital” argument as a flawed analogy to financial 
capital or property because the latter items have a “basis,” from which 
income is calculated as “the excess of the amount realized therefrom 
over the adjusted basis.”31  Unlike property, the Government contended, 
 22. Id. at 85-86 (citing Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); 31 
Op. Att’y. Gen. 304 (1918); T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918); H.R. Rep. 
No. 65-767 (1918)). 
 23. Id. at 85 (citing Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432 n.8). 
 24. Id. at 86 (citing 31 Op. Att’y. Gen. at 308). 
 25. Id. at 86. 
 26. Id. at 86 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 65-767, at 9-10). 
 27. Id. at 86. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 86-87. 
 31. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 1001(a)). 
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“people do not pay cash or its equivalent to acquire their well being, 
[thus] they have no basis in it for measuring a gain (or loss) upon the 
realization of compensatory damages.”32
B.  The D.C. Circuit’s Decision 
The D.C. Circuit ruled in Murphy’s favor and awarded her a refund 
of her tax payment, plus applicable interest.33  The court held that “[t]he 
Sixteenth Amendment simply does not authorize the Congress to tax as 
incomes every sort of revenue a taxpayer may receive.”34  While the 
court did concede that “the Supreme Court has broadly construed the 
phrase ‘gross income,’” the court noted that the Supreme Court also “has 
made plain that the power to tax incomes extends only to ‘gains’ or 
‘accessions to wealth.’”35
The court first applied the Supreme Court’s analysis in O’Gilvie v. 
United States,36 and considered “whether the taxpayer’s award of 
compensatory damages is ‘a substitute for [a] normally untaxed personal 
. . . quality, good, or ‘asset.’”37  The court reasoned that Murphy’s 
emotional well-being and good reputation were not taxable as income; 
therefore, compensatory damages for their loss likewise could not be 
considered income.38  Thus, the court held that “the Sixteenth 
Amendment does not empower the Congress to tax her award.”39
The D.C. Circuit next applied the Supreme Court’s approach in 
Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka,40 and examined the original 
understanding of “income” at the time the Sixteenth Amendment was 
adopted.41  Although the court did not rely on the 1918 House Report, it 
agreed with Murphy that the 1918 Opinion and the 1918 Ruling 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 92. 
 34. Id. at 87 (citing Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 
(1925) (“Congress cannot make a thing income which is not so in fact.”)). 
 35. Id. at 88 (citing Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 430, 431 (1955)). 
 36. 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996). 
 37. See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. 
at 86). 
 38. Id. (“[I]t is clear from the record that the damages were awarded to make 
Murphy emotionally and reputationally ‘whole’ and not to compensate her for lost 
wages or taxable earnings of any kind.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921). 
 41. See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 89-91. 
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indicated that incomes did not include “monies received solely in 
compensation for a personal injury and unrelated to lost wages or 
earnings.”42  The court noted a number of nonphysical injuries for which 
compensatory damages were available under state tort law as support for 
the conclusion that they were “not regarded differently than was 
compensation for injuries and, therefore, not considered income” by 
those who ratified the Sixteenth Amendment.43  Then, in a conclusion 
that was nothing short of astonishing, the D.C. Circuit concluded: 
In sum, every indication is that damages received solely in 
compensation for a personal injury are not income within the 
meaning of that term in the Sixteenth Amendment.  First, as 
compensation for the loss of a personal attribute, such as well-being 
or a good reputation, the damages are not received in lieu of income.  
Second, the framers of the Sixteenth Amendment would not have 
understood compensation for a personal injury—including a 
nonphysical injury—to be income.  Therefore, we hold § 104(a)(2) 
unconstitutional insofar as it permits the taxation of an award of 
damages for mental distress and loss of reputation.44
C.  Reaction 
Murphy is the first decision to strike down a tax statute as 
unconstitutional in over 80 years.45  The decision has generated as much 
controversy as can be expected from a milestone of this magnitude and 
has captured the attention of both tax professionals and the public at 
large.  Reaction from tax professionals and academics has been 
overwhelmingly negative.  Tax professors and constitutional law 
professors united (in what would be an unlikely alliance under any other 
circumstance) to denounce the opinion as “flawed,” “odd,” “bizarre,” 
and “horrible.”46  Tax professionals fear that the decision will give 
renewed inspiration to “tax protestors,” while legal scholars caution 
about the risks of increased judicial scrutiny of Congress’s power to 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 91. 
 44. Id. at 92 (emphasis added). 
 45. See supra note 1. 
 46. See Paul Caron, Tax Profs Weigh in on Murphy in Tax Notes (Sept. 5, 2006), 
available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2006/09/tax_profs_weigh.html; 
see also Caron, supra note 3. 
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tax.47  Personal injury lawyers, by contrast, have applauded the court’s 
ruling,48 and at least one economist has suggested that its rationale 
applies with equal force to the risk-free rate of interest.49
The reaction to Murphy should not be surprising.  Courts have 
traditionally deferred to legislatures’ exercise of the power of taxation, 
and the legal community has both accepted and defended this practice.  
Courts justify this deference not only on the basis of the need for tax 
revenue to enable a functioning government, but also on the basis of the 
Court’s broader practice of legislative deference with respect to 
economic legislation.50
Tax legislation, however, can be distinguished from other economic 
legislation in a number of ways.  Generally, regulatory economic 
legislation is designed to set basic “ground rules” for, and ensure a level 
playing field among, those who voluntarily participate in the object of 
the regulation.51  Tax legislation, by contrast, draws hundreds of 
 47. See Tom Herman, Court Ruling in Damages Case Deals Big Setback to the 
IRS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at D2; see also Peter Lattman, Bombshell Tax 
Decision From D.C. Circuit (Aug. 24, 2006), available at http://blogs.wsj.com 
/law/2006/08/24/bombshell-tax-decision-from-dc-circuit/; see also Caron, supra notes 3 
and 46. 
 48. See Robert W. Wood, Tax-Free Damages: Murphy’s Law Opens Floodgates 
(Sept. 4, 2006), available at: http://www.rothcpa.com/archives/002117.php#002117. 
 49. See Bruce Bartlett, What Can the Government Tax? (Aug. 30, 2006), available 
at http://www.woodporter.com/pdf/TN090406.pdf. 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994) (holding that retroactive 
federal estate tax legislation was neither illegitimate nor so arbitrary as to violate the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 
(1992) (declaring that tax classifications need only rationally further a legitimate state 
interest, so long as there is any plausible policy reason for the classification); see also 
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (“the presumption of constitutionality can 
be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile 
and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes”); see also 
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916).  In Brushaber, the Supreme 
Court held that 
a constitutional violation is warranted only where although there was a seeming 
exercise of the taxing power, the act complained of was so arbitrary as to constrain to 
the conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property, 
that is, a taking of the same in violation of the Fifth Amendment, or, what is 
equivalent thereto, was so wanting in basis for classification as to produce such a 
gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion. 
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24. 
 51. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000) (“The Fair Labor Standards Act”); see 
also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2000) (“The Securities Exchange Act”). 
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distinctions among otherwise similarly situated taxpayers according to 
varied and specific criteria.52  Tax legislation also implicates a number 
of personal rights that the Court has held to be fundamental in other 
contexts, such as marriage, family, the right to work and property.53  In 
this context, it is far from intuitive why courts should afford legislators 
more deference to define “income” than to define “speech,” “due 
process,” or “cruel and unusual.”54
The next part of this article will analyze Murphy in the context of 
Congress’s power to tax, as well as Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting this power.  As discussed in detail below, the D.C. Circuit 
ultimately took the wrong road, but arrived at the right place.  Critics are 
right to call attention to the flaws in the decision; however, these flaws 
are not the real cause of the controversy.  Court decisions do not attract 
widespread and sustained assault simply for holding a statute 
inapplicable to one specific type of compensatory damage award.  The 
controversy surrounding Murphy is the result of one sentence: “The 
Sixteenth Amendment simply does not authorize the Congress to tax as 
‘incomes’ every sort of revenue a taxpayer may receive.”55  The 
controversy surrounding Murphy exists because although courts have 
long recognized the truth in this proposition,56 few courts have acted to 
enforce it.57
 52. For example, § 1 classifies tax liability according to income amount (5 tax 
brackets) and filing status (4 classifications).  I.R.C. § 1.  Eligibility for certain 
adjustments to gross income are determined by gross income thresholds, and 
exemptions and itemized deductions are available only where adjusted gross income is 
below a stipulated amount and phases out when adjusted gross income exceeds a 
stipulated amount.  See discussion infra notes 183-84. 
 53. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, VIII, XIV and XVI. 
 55. See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 56. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 57. See supra notes 1, 4 and 50. 
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II.  MURPHY, TAXATION & THE “ACCESSION TO WEALTH RULE” 
A.  Analysis: The Wrong Road to the Right Place 
1.  The Wrong Road 
a.  Constitutional Interpretation 
The D.C. Circuit traced Congress’s taxation power to the Sixteenth 
Amendment; however, the Constitution expressly grants Congress the 
authority to tax in Article I,58 subject to two constraints.  Article I, § 8 
requires that all indirect taxes “be uniform throughout the United 
States.”59  Article I, § 9 requires Congress to apportion direct taxes 
among the states according to population as determined by a census.60
The Sixteenth Amendment did not grant Congress any new power; 
it merely removed the apportionment requirement with respect to one 
object of taxation—incomes.61  This much is plain from the text of the 
amendment: “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes 
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several states, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.”62
This fact is not a minor technical point.  States ratified the Sixteenth 
Amendment in direct response to a Supreme Court decision that struck 
down a federal income tax act as an unconstitutional direct tax.63  The 
distinction between direct and indirect taxes, though largely academic 
today, must be understood in this historical context.  The Supreme Court 
has interpreted “direct tax” to mean a tax levied directly on property 
because of its ownership and “indirect tax” as a tax “not levied directly 
on property because of its ownership, but rather on its use.”64  Thus, as a 
general rule, indirect taxes include taxes imposed on activity, such as 
 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  This power is plenary, as the Court has recognized that 
Congress’s power to tax is “exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of 
taxation [that it] has never been questioned, or if it has, has been so often authoritatively 
declared as to render it necessary only to state the doctrine.”  Brushaber v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916). 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 61. See Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18. 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 63. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
 64. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added) (discussing Pollock I). 
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consumption, the exercise of a privilege, or some other transaction, 
while direct taxes are taxes imposed on persons or property.65
The Court struck down the Tariff Act of 1894 (the “Act”) in 
Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Co. on the basis of these 
definitions.66  In Pollock I, the Court reasoned that apportionment, by 
operation, produced inequalities among the states and thus “must be held 
to have been contemplated, and was manifestly designed to operate to 
restrain the exercise of the power of direct taxation to extraordinary 
emergencies, and to prevent an attack upon accumulated property by 
mere force of numbers.”67  Stating that Congress cannot be allowed to 
accomplish indirectly what it cannot do directly, the Court concluded 
that a tax on income from property was not “so intrinsically different 
from a tax on [the property] itself as belonging to a wholly different 
class of taxes,” and therefore must be apportioned among the states.68
Prior to Pollock I, income taxes were generally regarded as indirect 
excise taxes.69  To the extent that Pollock I held otherwise, its holding 
rested squarely on the basis of the underlying source of the income.70  
Indeed, when considering the constitutionality of the remainder of the 
Act upon rehearing, the Court was careful to state: 
We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income 
derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and 
have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits 
from business, privileges, or employments [sic], in view of the 
 65. Prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, courts strained to classify taxes as indirect.  
In Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898), the Court held that 
an inheritance tax was a tax on succession—a beneficiary’s right to receive property— 
rather than as a direct tax on the decedent’s estate itself.  See also Knowlton v. Moore, 
178 U.S. 41 (1900).  In Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), the Court held that a 
federal tax on carriages was an excise tax on the carriage owners’ operations (the 
“conveyance of persons”), and not a direct tax on the ownership of the carriages 
themselves. 
 66. Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 583. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 581. 
 69. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 15. 
 70. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 633-36 
(1895).  Upon rehearing, the Court considered whether the remainder of the Tariff Act 
of 1894 was constitutional after the Court invalidated the provisions taxing income 
from property in Pollock I.  Id.  The Court held that Congress could not have intended 
for the burden of the tax to fall on labor and occupations, and struck the remainder of 
the act.  Id. at 637. 
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instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments 
has assumed the guise of an excise tax and has been sustained as 
such.71
The Court did not hold that Congress could not tax incomes, nor did 
it in any way limit the scope of incomes that Congress could tax.72  
Pollock I simply held that certain incomes must be taxed in a certain 
way.73  It is clear from the opinion that, if it wished, Congress could 
have levied an apportioned direct tax on incomes derived from property.  
To the extent that the Court considered the definition of income at all, it 
was only in the context of considering the Act’s definition of income as 
applied to property.74
States ratified the Sixteenth Amendment specifically to release 
Congress from the obligation of classifying incomes by source and 
providing for apportionment where necessary.75  The Amendment did 
not alter Congress’s power with the phrase “Congress shall have the 
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,” but with the words “from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several 
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”76
The D.C. Circuit erred in Murphy because a statute could not 
possibly violate an enabling amendment that serves to remove a 
limitation upon what is otherwise plenary authority under Article I.77  It 
is impossible to hold that Murphy’s award was not income as defined by 
 71. Id. at 635. 
 72. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 16-17. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895). 
 75. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18.  There, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
the [Sixteenth] Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the future 
with the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided, that is, of determining 
whether a tax on income was direct not by a consideration of the burden placed on the 
taxed income upon which it directly operated, but by taking into view the burden 
which resulted on the property from which the income was derived, since in express 
terms the Amendment provides that income taxes, from whatever source the income 
may be derived, shall not be subject to the regulation of apportionment. 
Id. 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 77. Prior to the Sixteenth Amendment (but after Pollock I), Congress could have 
chosen to enact apportioned taxes on incomes from property.  The Sixteenth 
Amendment served only to remove that constraint.  To the extent that the award is 
capital or property, it may still be subject to taxation under Article I, § 9.  Therefore, to 
the extent that the taxation of Murphy’s award violated any constitutional provision, it 
violated Article I, § 9. 
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the Sixteenth Amendment because the Sixteenth Amendment makes no 
attempt to define income.  The Sixteenth Amendment is relevant only to 
the extent that if Murphy’s award was in fact income, then Congress had 
plenary authority to tax it under Article I.  Consequently, the court had 
three options in Murphy: (1) decide whether the award was income 
subject to income tax, (2) hold the award to be property subject only to 
apportioned direct taxes, or (3) sustain the tax as an excise tax on the 
entire amount of the award, regardless of whether it was income.78
b.  Statutory Construction 
The court also erred in its interpretation of § 104(a)(2) of the 
Code79 and its construction of that section’s relationship to § 61(a).80  
Section 104(a)(2) does not, as the court stated, “make [Murphy’s] award 
taxable as income.”81  Rather, § 104(a)(2) fails to exclude Murphy’s 
award from taxable income.82  Absent another statutory exclusion, the 
proper inquiry should focus on whether § 61(a) includes the award in 
gross income.83
Section 61(a) defines “gross income” as “all income from whatever 
source derived, including (but not limited to) [15 enumerated 
sources].”84  The Supreme Court has interpreted this section to extend to 
“all gains,” from whatever source derived, “except those specifically 
exempted.”85  It follows then, that courts should first consider whether a 
specific exclusion applies to a particular receipt, and if it finds no such 
exclusion, consider whether the amount in question is in fact a “gain . . . 
 78. The court was correct to choose the first option.  See discussion infra notes 
154-60. 
 79. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). 
 80. Id. § 61(a). 
 81. See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 82. I.R.C. § 104(a) states that for purposes of § 104(a)(2), emotional distress shall 
not be treated as a physical injury or sickness, except to the extent of medical expenses 
attributable to emotional distress.  This text in effect renders unnecessary an inquiry 
into whether the amounts spent are actually income.  It does not justify the conclusion 
that the remainder of such awards are in fact income. 
 83. See Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 433 (2005) (“The definition [of gross 
income] extends broadly to all economic gains not otherwise exempted.”). 
 84. I.R.C. § 61(a). 
 85. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955); accord Banks, 543 
U.S. at 433. 
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derived from any source whatever.”86
Neither § 104(a)(2) nor any other exclusionary statute specifically 
provides for the exclusion of Murphy’s award.  This fact alone, 
however, fails to affirmatively establish that the award is actually 
income.  The absence of an exclusionary statute only establishes that 
compensatory damage awards are a source of income for the purpose of 
calculating gross income.87  It does not necessitate a conclusion that the 
award is in fact income to the taxpayer.  Such a conclusion could only 
be the result of an analysis of the nature, characteristics, and 
circumstances giving rise to the award. 
The D.C. Circuit should have held that Murphy was not required to 
include the award as gross income under § 61(a).  Alternatively, because 
such awards fall within the scope of sources from which gross income 
could be derived, the court also could have held that Murphy was 
required to report “0” as the amount of income attributable to her award.  
There was no need, however, for the court to declare § 104(a)(2) 
unconstitutional for failing to stipulate certain exclusions, but not 
others,88 particularly when the court was able to arrive at the same result 
simply by applying the language of the statute to the facts at issue. 
c.  Glenshaw Glass, Not O’Gilvie or Merchant’s 
The D.C. Circuit’s mistaken interpretation of the Sixteenth 
Amendment could be set aside as a point more important to 
constitutional scholars than to the outcome of the case.  Even the court’s 
striking of § 104(a)(2) “as applied” to Murphy’s award could stand on 
the basis that the section would still apply to the theoretically 
conceivable yet practically impossible instance where a court awards a 
taxpayer compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries that exceed the 
value of the actual injury.89  The D.C. Circuit erred more seriously, 
 86. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 429. 
 87. See discussion infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. 
 88. In Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972), the Tenth 
Circuit held that eligibility for a dependent care deduction (I.R.C. § 214(a)) 
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of gender.  Instead of holding § 214(a) 
unconstitutional, the court expanded the eligibility for the deduction to include both 
genders.  Id. 
 89. “Damages for personal injury are by definition compensatory only.”  Glenshaw 
Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432 n.11.  As a matter of law, compensatory damages will 
always equal the value of the injury, resulting in no gain to the injured party.  Any 
excess damages would be punitive. 
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however, when it mistakenly applied the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
O’Gilvie v. United States90 and Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Smietanka91 instead of the rule set forth in Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass& Co.92
O’Gilvie was a case about statutory interpretation, not a case about 
the definition of income.93  The question at issue in O’Gilvie was 
whether the prior version of § 104(a)(2), which excluded the “amount of 
any damages . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness,” excluded 
punitive as well as compensatory damages through the use of the phrase 
“on account of.”94  The issue in O’Gilvie was not whether Congress 
could tax punitive damages as income—that issue was decided over 
forty years earlier in Glenshaw Glass.95  The issue was whether the 
ambiguous language of the statute actually excluded punitive damages.96  
The Court considered whether the damages were “a substitute for [a] 
normally untaxed personal . . . quality, good, or ‘asset’” only to the 
extent that it was indicative of congressional intent.97  In Murphy, 
Congress’s intent to tax compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries 
was clear—the issue before the court was whether Congress could. 
Though the “substitute” analysis applied in O’Gilvie can be 
indicative of whether an item is “income,” it is not determinative.  
Congress can, and does, choose not to tax certain forms of income as a 
matter of public policy.98  Similarly, the Court has never given 
significant weight to whether an item is historically untaxed in deciding 
whether or not it is income.  To the contrary, the Court in Glenshaw 
Glass expressly dismissed the argument that punitive damages were not 
taxable because they were not taxed in prior versions of the Code.99
 90. 519 U.S. 79 (1996). 
 91. 255 U.S. 509 (1921). 
 92. 348 U.S. at 431. 
 93. See O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 81. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432-33. 
 96. See O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 81. 
 97. Id. at 86-87. 
 98. For example, in Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), the Supreme Court held 
that alimony payments made to a wife are taxable to the husband.  Currently, the Code 
allows a taxpayer to exclude payments for a spouse and requires the payee spouse to 
include the payments in gross income.  See I.R.C. §§ 71, 215. 
 99. See Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431-32; see also Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 (1978) (holding that the fact that item is not subject to 
withholding does not mean that it is not gross income). 
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The “substitute” analysis would require not only the exclusion of 
other compensation payments that would be “accessions to wealth” 
under Glenshaw Glass, but would also exclude other items currently 
taxed under the Code.  For example, suppose a company purchased a 
building for $600,000.  Now suppose that five years later, when the 
building had a fair market value of $700,000, it was destroyed due to a 
contractor’s negligence.  The company recovers $700,000 from the 
contractor.  Even though a building is an asset normally untaxed by 
Congress, the taxpayer has realized a gain of $100,000.100  While this 
gain is properly taxed as income under § 170 of the Code,101 the 
O’Gilvie analysis would dictate the opposite result. 
Furthermore, the court’s reliance on original understanding is 
unnecessary.  Although the court cited Merchants’ Bank as authoritative, 
courts have since emphasized plain meaning in its interpretations of tax 
laws.102  “Income” is a limited concept with certain characteristics that 
have been consistently recognized, similar to “property” and 
“contracts.”103  Moreover, while the Court did look to original 
understanding in O’Gilvie, it did so only to determine the legislative 
intent of a statute, not for guidance on the definition of income.104
d.  No Accession to Wealth 
The D.C. Circuit should have resolved Murphy through a 
straightforward application of Glenshaw Glass.  In Glenshaw Glass, the 
Court addressed whether income from a particular source is taxable.105  
The definition of income was not at issue, as the Court recognized the 
 100. See William A. Klein et al., Federal Income Taxation, 140 (13th ed. 2003). 
 101. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(2). 
 102. See Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432; see also Helvering v. Edison Bros. 
Stores, Inc., 133 F.2d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 1943) (“The meaning of the word ‘income’ in 
the Sixteenth Amendment and the acts of Congress pursuant [thereto] is that given it in 
common speech and every day usage.”). 
 103. See discussion infra notes 116-17 and 130-31. 
 104. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. 
 105. 348 U.S. at 430.  Punitive damages were not specifically enumerated, and the 
Court was interpreting the effect of the “catchall provision” of § 22(a) (the predecessor 
statute to § 61(a)).  Id.  The Court explained “we cannot but ascribe content to the 
catchall provision of § 22(a), ‘gains or profits and income derived from any source 
whatever.’  The importance of that phrase has been too [sic] frequently recognized since 
its first appearance in the Revenue Act of 1913 to say now that it adds nothing to the 
meaning of ‘gross income.’”  Id. 
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award was (1) an accession to wealth, (2) clearly realized, and (3) one 
over which the recipient exercised complete dominion.106  The Court has 
since consistently defined income in the context of these three 
elements.107  Murphy presented a different issue: the parties contested 
the award’s classification as income, not whether the award was a 
source of taxable income.  Still, an examination of Murphy’s award in 
the context of the Court’s definition of income in Glenshaw Glass 
suggests that the D.C. Circuit was correct in holding that the award was 
not income. 
Realization and dominion were not at issue in Murphy; the record is 
clear that both elements were satisfied.108  The decisive issue was 
whether Murphy’s award was in fact an “accession to wealth.”  The 
Government argued that Murphy’s entire award was an accession to 
wealth, while Murphy argued that no part of the award met that 
condition.109
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance 
on how to determine whether an amount is an “accession to wealth,” as 
each subsequent case turned on its own set of facts.110  As a result, each 
party in Murphy had to articulate its points in terms of existing tax 
concepts, resulting in awkward arguments on both sides.  Murphy’s 
claim rested on the notion of “human capital,” a notion discussed in 
dicta but never completely adopted by either Congress or the Court.111  
The Government argued that human beings have a “zero basis” in their 
well-being and that taxpayers are not permitted to depreciate 
themselves.112
Not surprisingly, awkward arguments resulted in an awkward 
opinion.  Without accepting Murphy’s “human capital argument,” the 
court held that the purpose of Murphy’s award was to restore her to the 
“status quo ante,” e.g., the economic equivalent of her position prior to 
 106. Id. at 431.  The Court thus adopted a broader definition of income than it had 
previously applied in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (defining income 
as “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined”). 
 107. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005), discussed infra notes 125-29; 
see also Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83 (1977). 
 108. See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 109. Id. at 85-88. 
 110. The “substitute” analysis from O’Gilvie would be helpful here as the results 
would often be similar, but from a doctrinal perspective, that approach has flaws for the 
reasons discussed supra notes 98-100. 
 111. See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85. 
 112. See id. at 87. 
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her injury, and thus the award was neither a “gain” nor an “accession to 
wealth.”113  While the court’s decision was intuitively correct, the fact 
that its opinion was not written in conventional tax terminology 
provided the basis for a substantial amount of criticism.114
B.  A Rule for Determining an “Accession to Wealth” 
Murphy demonstrates the need for the Supreme Court to provide 
clear guidance on how to distinguish “accessions to wealth” from the 
broader category of receipts.  This distinction is necessary because the 
Supreme Court has recognized that “income” is not simply a label that 
Congress may apply to any item it wishes to tax.  As Murphy correctly 
noted, “Congress cannot make a thing income which is not so in fact.”115  
It is currently unclear what facts courts should consider when 
determining whether there has been an “accession to wealth” under 
Glenshaw Glass.  Should courts examine the receipt of the award, in 
isolation, as the Government suggested in Murphy or should courts look 
to events as a whole, and consider amounts in the context of the events 
that resulted in their receipt?  Are courts constrained only to those 
principles recognized in the Code or should courts also consider the 
inherent characteristics of the alleged taxable event? 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized an event or 
transaction as a gain or an accession to wealth where the total accretion 
of wealth to the taxpayer attributable to a transaction or event exceeds 
the diminution of wealth the taxpayer incurred from such transaction or 
event.116  This interpretation, referred to throughout the remainder of this 
article as the “accession to wealth rule” (or, “the rule”), applied within 
the Glenshaw Glass framework, justifies early precedents involving 
punitive damages, windfalls, and treasure troves, as well as the 
exclusion of compensatory damages, returns of capital, and stock 
dividends, and is consistent with the Code’s existing notion of basis.117
 
 113. See id. at 88. 
 114. See discussion supra notes 3 and 46. 
 115. Murphy, 460 F.3d at 87. 
 116. In this context, the O’Gilvie analysis is helpful in separating the gain from what 
would normally go untaxed.  Thus, in the example in Part A, supra, the $100,000 gain 
would be separated from the cost of the untaxed house destroyed, which would be 
consistent with recognizing no gain attributable to compensating Murphy for her 
untaxed well-being and reputation. 
 117. Indeed, the denial of a recognition of a “net gain” concept would require a 
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C. The Accession to Wealth Rule in the Context of 
 Supreme Court Precedent 
In Glenshaw Glass, both awards at issue were accessions to wealth 
because the accretions and diminutions of wealth were presumed, as a 
matter of law, when the trial court awarded the respondents 
compensation for lost profits.118  The court’s punishment of the 
offending parties, by contrast, did not in any way diminish the victims’ 
wealth.119  Consequently, the accretion of the victims’ wealth 
attributable to punitive damages exceeded the victims’ diminution of 
wealth by the entire amount of the award.  It was clear from the record 
that the victims each realized and exercised dominion over these awards, 
so the Court properly deemed the damages to be income. 
The rule also justifies the exclusion of stock dividends in Eisner v. 
Macomber because although there was an accession to wealth over 
which shareholders exercised complete dominion, the shareholders did 
not realize these dividends.120  In that case, there would have been an 
accession to wealth to the shareholder due to the increase in the value of 
the net assets of the underlying corporation.  This much would be true 
whether Standard Oil issued a stock dividend or no dividend 
whatsoever.121  Each shareholder exercised complete dominion over its 
 
curious interpretation of Glenshaw Glass—that wherever receipt of an amount results in 
any accession to wealth to the recipient, the entire amount received would be taxable 
regardless of the actual amount of the accession to wealth by the recipient.  Such an 
interpretation would be inconsistent with prior decisions distinguishing receipts from 
incomes, particularly Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, discussed infra, notes 138-47. 
 118. Compensatory damages for lost profits are calculated by assuming, as a matter 
of law, that business operations prevented by the events giving rise to plaintiff’s claim 
had, in fact, occurred.  Therefore, courts construct sales (accretions of wealth) and costs 
(diminutions of wealth) and award the lost profit (the accession to wealth).  Even 
though these damages are “compensatory,” they compensate for an accession to wealth, 
and are rightly taxable.  The determination of lost profits in Glenshaw Glass is 
discussed at length in the lower court opinions.  See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 
211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1954); see also Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 860 
(1954). 
 119. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); see also supra 
notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
 120. 252 U.S. 189, 208-12 (1920). 
 121. See id. at 211-12.  The shareholder’s wealth would increase by the incremental 
increase in value of the corporation’s assets as represented by that shareholder’s shares, 
regardless of whether the corporation retains this value or distributes it as a dividend. 
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shares by virtue of their ownership,122 yet did not realize this accession 
to wealth, because, as the Court stated, the “essential and controlling fact 
is that the stockholder has received nothing out of the company’s assets 
for his separate use and benefit.”123  The Court then added that “[f]ar 
from being a realization of profits . . . [stock dividends] tend[] rather to 
postpone such realization.”124
At first glance, the Court’s holding in Commissioner v. Banks 
seems inconsistent with the accession to wealth rule.125  In Banks, the 
taxpayers received punitive damages and excluded from gross income 
the portion of the award paid as contingency fees to their attorneys.126  
The taxpayers argued that they never exercised complete dominion over 
the portion of the award paid as contingency fees, and the Court ruled 
against them by applying the anticipatory assignment of income 
doctrine.127  The taxpayers did not challenge the inclusion of the entire 
award as an accession to wealth nor did they argue that the denial of a 
deduction for legal fees was inequitable.  In an amicus brief, the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America argued that the fees should be 
subtracted as a capital expense from the disposition of personal 
property.128  This argument bears similarities to arguments challenging 
the amount of an accession to wealth, but the Court declined to consider 
the argument because it was the first time the argument was presented in 
the case and it had not been examined by the Court of Appeals.129
D.  A Tax on Net Income 
This is not to say that courts should apply the accession to wealth 
rule in every case where a taxpayer claims a payment is not income, but 
only to say that courts should ensure that Congress levies the income tax 
 
 122. See id. at 208-09. 
 123. Id. at 211. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 543 U.S. 426 (2005).  Banks is the Court’s most recent occasion to consider the 
issue of income in the context of Glenshaw Glass. 
 126. Id. at 429-32. 
 127. Id. at 434-38. 
 128. Id. at 437. 
 129. Id. at 438.  Had the taxpayers in Banks challenged the inclusion by claiming 
that portion was not an “accession to wealth,” the Court may not even have reached the 
issues decided in Banks, because if there was no accession to wealth in the first place, 
there would have been no need to consider whether the taxpayers exercised complete 
dominion over the award or if the taxpayers’ income had been assigned. 
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on incomes and not receipts.  Courts have long ago recognized that 
Congress implemented the income tax to “carry out a broad basic policy 
of taxing net, not gross income,”130 and the “term ‘[i]ncome’ as used in 
the Revenue Acts includes only gain or profit as a basis for income 
taxation and they exclude gross receipts or gross income as such a 
basis.”131  Where a taxpayer claims an amount is not income and 
Congress has prescribed a method to derive income from revenues,132 
then, barring any constitutional infirmity,133 courts need only determine 
whether the prescribed method is correctly applied.134  Courts should 
apply the accession to wealth rule, however, in cases like Murphy, where 
it is unclear whether an amount is revenue or income and Congress is 
silent on how to make the distinction. 
This practice would not turn judges into tax law activists.  To the 
contrary, courts have given legislatures a substantial degree of latitude in 
how they exercise their taxing power as well as how they design tax 
policy.135  Courts place no limitations on the items Congress may tax.  
Courts routinely support how Congress imposes taxes.136  Congress has 
plenary power to impose excise taxes on revenues if it wishes.137  It is 
not activism to ensure that Congress actually taxes income when it 
purports to do so. 
In 1935, the Supreme Court decided Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. 
Lewis, a case involving the state of Kentucky’s graduated tax on gross 
sales receipts.138  The tax rate on sales increased by three-twentieths of 
one percent for each additional $100,000 of sales volume.139  The Court 
 130. Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958) (internal citations 
omitted); see also McDonald v. Comm’r, 323 U.S. 57, 66 (1944). 
 131. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863, 865 (D. Minn. 
1942). 
 132. See discussion infra, notes 173-79. 
 133. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218 (1920) (although the income 
tax statute prescribed a way to calculate the gain from a stock dividend, the Court held 
that stock dividends were not income). 
 134. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 
 135. See discussion supra notes 4 and 50. 
 136. See discussion supra note 50. 
 137. See discussion supra notes 58-77. 
 138. 294 U.S. 550 (1935). 
 139. Id. at 554.  The tax rate on gross sales was 0.05% on the first $400,000 of gross 
sales, 0.10% on the next $100,000 of gross sales, and then increased by 0.15% for each 
additional $100,000 of gross sales not exceeding an aggregate of $1,000,000.  The 
statute assessed a 1% tax rate on gross sales in excess of $1,000,000. 
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struck down the tax as a violation of due process, holding the tax to be 
“unjustifiably unequal, whimsical, and arbitrary . . . .”140  The Court’s 
underlying rationale in Stewart was based on two key principles.  First, a 
graduated tax on gross sales imposed an incremental tax on volume, and 
arbitrarily imposed increasing taxes on identical transactions solely 
because one was performed “more often [sic] than the other.”141  The 
second principle was that a graduated tax on gross sales, unlike a 
graduated tax on income, did not bear a rational relation to a taxpayer’s 
ability to pay.142  The Court expressly distinguished sales from income, 
and graduated taxes on each, because “[a]n income levy by its very 
nature assures equality of treatment, because the burden of the exaction 
varies with increase or decrease of return on capital invested and with 
the comparative success or failure of the enterprise.”143  Ability to pay 
was determined from profitability—by accounting for the business’s 
costs and management decisions.144  Prior to this decision, the Court had 
consistently upheld progressive taxes based upon wealth or the ability to 
pay.145  The Court expressly rejected Kentucky’s argument that gross 
sales were an acceptable proxy for income or ability to pay, as well as 
the argument that administrative convenience justified this simpler 
method.146  Thus, the Court held that graduated taxes on receipts are 
unjustified when marginal receipts are a function of increasing 
volume.147
 140. Id. at 557. 
 141. Id. at 566 (“It exacts from two persons different amounts for the privilege of 
doing exactly similar acts because the one has performed the act oftener than the 
other.”). 
 142. Id. at 558. 
 143. Id. at 560. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (upholding a 
progressive tax based on the value of the estate); see also Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 
41, 109 (1900) (upholding a similar inheritance tax against a uniformity clause 
challenge); see also Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916) 
(upholding the progressive rate structure of a federal income tax statute). 
 146. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 294 U.S. at 560 (“If the commonwealth desires to tax 
incomes, it must take the trouble equitably to distribute the burden of the impost.  Gross 
inequalities may not be ignored for the sake of ease of collection.”); see also id. at 563 
(“The record fails to show that an income tax or a flat tax on sales would not 
accomplish the desired end.”). 
 147. Id. at 565-66; see also Valentine v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 
(1936) (invalidating an Iowa gross sales tax, citing Stewart); In re Williams, 1995 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16222 at 23 (discussing Stewart when distinguishing a gross receipts tax 
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E.  The Right Place: Murphy Revisited 
A straightforward application of the accession to wealth rule within 
the framework of Glenshaw Glass illustrates why the D.C. Circuit 
decided Murphy correctly.  Murphy’s award caused her wealth to 
accrete by $70,000 in compensation for nonphysical injuries.148  An 
administrative law judge determined that these same nonphysical 
injuries diminished her wealth by $70,000.149  Her accession to wealth 
from these injuries, therefore, was $0. 
The Government’s “basis” argument misses the point.  At its core, 
“basis” is nothing more than the mechanism chosen by Congress to 
measure the cost of property.150  This mechanism serves two functions: 
(1) it measures taxpayers’ gains, and (2) it ensures that Congress does 
not overstep its constitutional bounds and tax underlying property.151  
Depreciation, depletion and amortization are simply statutory 
 
from a gains tax).  Compare N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of N.Y., 303 U.S. 573, 
583 (1938) (upholding a fixed-rate gross receipts tax). 
 148. Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 149. Id. 
 150. I.R.C. § 1012 provides that “the basis of property shall be the cost of such 
property, except as otherwise provided . . . .”  The Code defines property as “tangible 
items.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1986). 
 151. See discussion supra note 68.  Some argue that the primary purpose of basis is 
to ensure that the same dollars should not be taxed to the same taxpayer more than once.  
See Deborah A. Geier, Murphy and the Evolution of “Basis,” 113 TAX NOTES 576, 578 
(Nov. 6, 2006).  While basis does generally operate so as to prevent the taxation of 
previously taxed dollars, in Murphy’s case such previous taxation of her well-being 
could not constitutionally occur without apportionment as either a direct or capitation 
tax.  If, as the Court discussed in O’Gilvie, Congress can tax a substitute payment in the 
same way manner as it could the original, why would constraints that protect the 
original not extend to the substitute?  See discussion supra note 97.  If the sole purpose 
of basis is to further a congressional policy, then there is no reason why Congress could 
not do away with the notion of basis entirely and impose an income tax on, for example, 
the entire amount of a purchase price received by a seller of property.  It is unclear why 
such a tax would not be a direct tax imposed upon the value of the seller’s property, 
simply deferred until such property is sold.  Indeed, if such deferred direct taxes are 
constitutionally permissible, then it is not clear why it was necessary for the Supreme 
Court to recast inheritance taxes as excise taxes levied on the beneficiaries’ right to 
receive an inheritance, as opposed to the owner’s right to devise.  Furthermore, if a 
parallel rationale applies that would enable Congress to levy an excise tax on a property 
owner’s right to sell his or her property, then it is hard to see why it was necessary to 
adopt the 16th Amendment in the first place. 
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innovations to apply this mechanism over a period of time.152  Basis is 
not a constitutional requirement, but merely the method Congress chose 
to measure particular costs.  It does not follow that basis is the only way 
to measure costs, nor does it follow that costs to which the concept of 
basis does not extend should not be measured.  In Murphy’s case, the 
costs of her loss were valued at trial, where the judge determined she 
had suffered harm in the amount of $70,000.153
Because Congress’s power to tax is plenary and extends far beyond 
the power to tax incomes, Congress could tax Murphy’s award whether 
or not it was income, as the IRS argued.154  As stated above, the court 
had three options: (1) analyze whether the award was income subject to 
income tax, (2) hold the award to be property subject only to 
apportioned direct taxes, or (3) sustain the tax as an excise tax on the 
entire amount of the award.  Although the court chose the first option, it 
is worth briefly discussing the other two. 
First, had the court accepted Murphy’s “human capital” argument, 
the award would operate as a restoration of capital.155  As such, a tax on 
the award would be an unapportioned direct tax, and consequently fail 
for that defect.156  Second, Congress could clearly levy an excise tax on 
the “right” to receive compensatory damages, as it has done with respect 
to inheritances in Magoun.157  However, courts should be wary of 
converting tax statutes suffering from constitutional defect into other 
“legitimate” taxes.158  While the Supreme Court has stated that the 
 152. I.R.C. § 1016 provides for “adjustments to basis”—a method by which a 
taxpayer can “recover” the cost of property over its useful life.  Depreciation, 
amortization and depletion are conventions by which the taxpayer recovers the costs of 
property against the income the property produces.  At the time of disposition, the 
adjusted basis of property is substantially below cost (possibly zero) and the taxpayer 
will pay tax on a larger (possibly the entire) amount of gain.  However, since the cost is 
recovered over the life of its use, the Code ensures that the value of the property itself is 
accounted for at some point, and thus not taxed.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167-69, 197 and 
199. 
 153. See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 81. 
 154. See id. at 86. 
 155. See discussion supra notes 20-21, 58-68. 
 156. See discussion supra notes 58-68. 
 157. See discussion supra note 65. 
 158. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).  In Gould, the Court held: 
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend 
their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to 
enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out.  In case 
of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the 
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Sixteenth Amendment operated so as to bring all income taxes within 
the category of indirect taxes,159 it has also recognized that income taxes 
are distinct from other forms of excise taxes.160
If the court held that a defective income tax converted into a valid 
excise tax by default, several issues would arise.  First, the court would 
have to determine what rate the tax would impose.  Would the court 
impose a judicially determined rate?  If so, they would violate the 
separation of powers.  If not, would the court apply the Code’s 
graduated rate structure to the award?  Second, if courts apply the 
Code’s graduated rates, would these rates apply to the award in isolation 
or at the marginal rate of the recipient’s last dollar of taxable income?  
The absence of a statute authorizing a different excise tax would either 
result in a judicially-imposed tax or make the tax impossible to 
administer and arbitrary in operation. 
III.  MURPHY & WAGES: NO, THE SKY IS NOT FALLING 
A.  Is Murphy Really a Tax Protestor’s Dream Come True? 
After Murphy was decided, tax experts predicted the decision 
would give new inspiration to “tax protestors”—taxpayers who 
challenge (usually pro se) the government’s power to tax wages based 
on a variety of long discredited constitutional theories, one of which 
happens to be a variation of the “human capital” theory.161  Tax 
protestors have made three general arguments based on this theory, none 
of which are any stronger after Murphy. 
The first argument is that wages and labor are a “like kind 
exchange” from which neither the wage earner nor the employer 
recognize a gain.  Tax exemptions for such exchanges are predicated 
upon an exchange of property of similar classification.162  This argument 
fails for two reasons.  First, labor is not “property” as defined in Treas. 
Reg. § 1.61-6.163  Second, even if labor were property, an exchange of 
 
citizen. 
Id. 
 159. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 19 (1916) (stating that the 
Sixteenth Amendment’s effect was to prevent taking “an income tax out of the class of 
excises, duties and imposts and place it in the class of direct taxes”). 
 160. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text. 
 161. See, e.g., Yuen v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Nev. 2003). 
 162. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1). 
 163. See supra note 150. 
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labor for money would not qualify as an exchange of “property of like 
kind which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business 
or for investment.”164
The second tax protestor argument is that labor is human capital; 
therefore, the payment of wages for this labor constitutes a non-taxable 
return of capital.165  This argument fails because a taxpayer’s labor is not 
capital, human or otherwise, for much the same reason a stock dividend 
was not income in Eisner v. Macomber.  Assuming that labor is the 
result of an investment in human capital (one’s person), labor is severed 
from the employee when provided to the employer, while the person 
remains intact and undiminished after his labor is complete.166  Murphy 
in no way alters the responses to these arguments. 
Another related argument of tax protestors is that no gain is realized 
upon the payment of wages because wages represent the fair market 
value of the labor the employee provided.167  This argument is equally 
frivolous as a matter of law, as the Code is clear that gains are calculated 
on the basis of cost, not fair market value at the time of exchange.168  
According to this rationale, no business would ever recognize gains 
from the sale of goods, as the very act of purchase is prima facie 
evidence of fair market value.169  However, by rejecting the claim that 
no amount of wages received constitutes gain, does it necessarily follow 
that the entire amount of wages received is gain? 
 164. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 165. See Parker v. Comm’r, 724 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 166. Compare Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 212 (1920) (holding that stock 
dividends were not income because no separate property or capital was severed from 
the corporation and distributed to the shareholder). 
 167. See Lonsdale v. Comm’r, 661 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981) (appellants arguing 
that “the exchange of services for money is a zero-sum transaction, the value of the 
wages being exactly that of the labor exchanged for them and hence containing no 
element of profit”); see also Davis v. United States, 742 F.2d 171, 172 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(taxpayer arguing “that an individual receives no taxable gain from the exchange of 
labor for money because the wages received are offset by an equal amount of ‘costs of 
labor’”). 
 168. I.R.C. § 1012.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(a) defines “cost” as “the amount paid for 
such property in cash or other property.”  Thus, the cost basis of property may be the 
fair market value of property surrendered in the exchange, but not the property received. 
 169. Rational actors acting at arm’s-length usually transact at fair market value in 
the conduct of their daily affairs. 
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B.  Wages in the Context of Glenshaw Glass 
The Code distinguishes a taxpayer’s gross income (the taxpayer’s 
aggregate amount of income received in a given period) from its taxable 
income (the amount of income the government taxes).170  The Code 
provides for this distinction through a statutory framework that generally 
operates as follows: 
 
Gross Income 
Less: Adjustments to Gross Income
= Adjusted Gross Income171
 
Adjusted Gross Income 
Less: Standard or Itemized Deduction(s) 
Less: Personal and Dependency Exemptions
= Taxable Income172
 
This statutory framework is generally faithful to the historical 
notion of income as net income (as well as the principles set forth in 
Glenshaw Glass and the proposed accession to wealth rule) with respect 
to property or business operations.  Consequently, taxpayers include 
only the gain from sales of property in gross income.173  For example, 
the Code uses basis to determine gains from transactions in property.174  
Taxpayers calculate this amount on Schedule D and report this result as 
gross income on Form 1040.175  Similarly, gross income derived from 
business is defined as “total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any 
income from investments and from incidental operations or outside 
operations or sources.”176  Thus, business owners subtract both the basis 
of property sold, as well as an “expenditure basis” in the form of 
“ordinary and necessary” business expenses such as salaries, taxes paid 
 
 170. I.R.C. §§ 62-63. 
 171. Id. § 62. 
 172. Id. § 63. 
 173. I.R.C. § 61(a) (“[G]ross income means . . . gains derived from dealings in 
property.”). 
 174. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6 (“gain is the excess of the amount realized over the 
unrecovered cost or other basis for the property sold or exchanged”). 
 175. Form 1040 (“U.S. Individual Income Tax Return”) is the form most individual 
taxpayers use to report their income tax liability.  Gains and losses calculated on 
Schedule D (“Capital Gains and Losses”) are reported on Form 1040, line 13. 
 176. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3. 
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and travel expenses.177  They calculate their net income on Schedule C 
and report this result as gross income on Form 1040.178  Similar methods 
are stipulated for rental and royalty income.179  Each of these methods 
ensures that taxpayers report gains, and not aggregate receipts, from 
these activities. 
There is no analogous statutory provision for wages and 
compensation for services.  Taxpayers earning wages report the entire 
amount of earned wages as gross income, despite the fact that they may 
not receive the entire amount.180  The Code does not allow wage earners 
to subtract the costs of earning those wages to arrive at “gross income 
from wages,” despite the fact that these costs can be substantial.181  
Payroll taxes, state and local income taxes, and travel expenses are all 
costs that employees incur as a result of their employment, and these 
expenses would certainly qualify as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses under § 162.182  Yet the Code expressly prohibits a deduction 
for payroll taxes and commuting expenses, and allows deductions for 
state and local taxes only as itemized deductions.183  Any taxpayer may 
elect to itemize their deductions, but these deductions may ultimately be 
disallowed by operation of phase-outs or the Alternative Minimum 
Tax.184  The Code also assigns no value to the labor the wage earner 
 177. I.R.C. § 162 (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business . . . .”). 
 178. Schedule C (“Profit or Loss From Business”), reported on Form 1040, line 12. 
 179. Schedule E (“Supplemental Income and Loss”), reported on Form 1040, line 
17. 
 180. Form 1040, line 7. 
 181. For example, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) imposes 
payroll taxes at a rate of 7.65% of gross wages (6.2% for Social Security taxes, and 
1.45% for Medicare taxes).  I.R.C. § 3101. 
 182. I.R.C. § 162.  Payroll taxes paid by employers pursuant to I.R.C. § 3111 are 
deductible under this section.  See Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928) 
(holding that where a matter relating to business ordinarily and necessarily requires 
expenditure, it is an ‘ordinary and necessary’ expense of that business”). 
 183. I.R.C. §§ 164, 275.  These deductions would be “above the line” for taxpayers 
operating a trade or business, and not subject to any limitation, see infra note 184, and 
taxpayers could still take either the standard or itemized deduction.  Taxpayers earning 
wages, however, could only take these deductions if their aggregate itemized deductions 
exceed the standard deduction ($5,150 for unmarried individuals in 2006), and are 
subject to limitations.  I.R.C. § 63. 
 184. Personal exemption amounts are reduced when a taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income exceeds $100,000 (if unmarried) or $150,000 (if married and filing a joint 
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provided.  Thus, employees who work 75 hours are deemed to provide 
the same value of labor to their employers—$0—as those who work 40 
hours.185
The income tax thus operates upon wage earners in a manner 
contrary to its original purpose, not only as recognized by the Supreme 
Court, but also as expressed by the language of § 61(a), its authorizing 
statute.  Section 61(a) is ultimately a source statute.  It embodies “the 
full measure of [Congress’s] taxing power,” and has been deemed 
“coextensive with” (and therefore given the same interpretation as) the 
Sixteenth Amendment, and thus establishes sources of income, not 
definitions.186
Section 61(a) states, with respect to wages, “gross income means all 
income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) . . . 
compensation for services . . . .”187  If the purpose of the sentence was to 
define what constitutes gross income, as opposed to where it is to be 
found, it would read as follows: “gross income means all income, from 
whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) . . . compensation 
for services . . . .”  The word “including” would instead modify 
“income,” not “source,” and the phrase “from whatever source derived” 
would be nothing more than an appositive phrase evincing Congress’s 
acknowledgement of the fact that gross income may be found in other 
sources not listed therein.  As written, however, the word “including” 
must be taken to modify “source,” and thus interpreted as Congress 
expressing its intent to tax income regardless of where it is found.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the Court’s interpretation of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.188
Predecessor statutes to § 61(a) support this reading.  Section 22(a) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, for example, stated “‘Gross 
income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, 
wages, or compensation for personal service . . . of whatever kind and in 
whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, 
return).  See I.R.C. § 151.  Itemized deductions generally are phased-out when adjusted 
gross income exceeds $150,500.  See I.R.C. § 68(a) and (b).  In calculating Alternative 
Minimum Tax liability, deductions for state and local taxes are disallowed.  See I.R.C. 
§ 56(b). 
 185. See discussion infra notes 204-05. 
 186. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); see also discussion supra 
notes 75 and 76. 
 187. I.R.C. § 61. 
 188. See generally Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
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commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, 
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also 
from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any 
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income 
derived from any source whatever. . . .”189  The placement of “income” 
in this sentence, after the terms “gains” and “profits,” justifies 
interpreting the word consistent with its definition as a gain, as opposed 
to its broader definition of “inflows” or “receipts.”190  Furthermore, the 
Tariff Act of 1894 provided for the exclusion of costs incurred when 
paying taxes on wages.191
These statutes and the Court’s statements together illustrate the 
historical understanding that the amount of wages that constitutes 
income to a wage earner is less than the full amount of wages he actually 
earns.  So why is it that Congress never made provisions for employees 
to adjust for the costs they incur when earning their income?  The 
Revenue Act of 1913 imposed a tax of 1% on income exceeding the first 
$3,000 of taxable income ($4,000 if married).192  At the time, this 
amount excluded 98% of workers.193  Congress could have realistically 
determined that such a provision was unnecessary based on the 
improbability that the costs incurred would exceed that amount.194  
Moreover, the personal income tax evolved over time to encompass a 
variety of personal deductions and exemptions unrelated to income, such 
as deductions for the mortgage interest paid on a primary residence, 
college tuition, interest on student loans, retirement savings and medical 
expenses.  It could be argued that these deductions have the effect of 
accounting for the costs of earning wages.195
 189. I.R.C. § 22(a); see also Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 
(1955). 
 190. According to the rule of noscitur a sociis, a canon of interpretation meaning “a 
word is known by the company it keeps.”  See generally Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 
367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).  Congress did not change the definition’s application to 
wages with subsequent textual changes to the definition of gross income, because, as 
the Court acknowledged in Glenshaw Glass, Congress did not intend to alter the scope 
of “gross income” in any way when it altered the language of the statute.  See Glenshaw 
Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432. 
 191. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 429 n.1 (1895). 
 192. See Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 23. 
 193. See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and 
Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 15 n.40 (2002). 
 194. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 195. I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(6)-(20), 163(h)(3), and 213. 
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While each of these justifications may have been true at some point, 
none are true today.  With the exception of the standard deduction, there 
is no single exemption amount available to all wage earners.  The 
current amount of the standard deduction does not have the effect of 
exempting reasonably conceivable costs, as the amount is less than the 
statutory cap on payroll taxes.196  Personal exemptions and itemized 
deductions “phase out” after a certain adjusted gross income is 
exceeded.197  Moreover, these are personal deductions—a product of 
legislative policy designed to ease burdens on taxpayers unrelated to the 
cost of producing income.198  Finally, deductions are a matter of 
“legislative grace.”199  Congress is bound by few constitutional 
constraints when determining eligibility of deductions, and can grant or 
disallow them on the basis of almost any condition.200
C.  The Accession to Wealth Rule Applied: 
How Much of Wages are Income? 
When an employee earns its salary, its wealth accretes by the 
amount of the salary earned.  However, the employee’s wealth 
 
 196. The standard deduction for single taxpayers in 2006 is $5,150.  I.R.C. § 63.  
FICA imposes a payroll tax of 7.65% on the first $94,200 of wages ($7,206.30).  I.R.C. 
§ 3101. 
 197. I.R.C. §§ 68 and 151. 
 198. See General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. Rep. No. 99-
3838, at 8-10 (Conf. Rep.).  The Joint Committee report reveals that the overriding 
goals for these deductions were simplicity and progressivity: 
Significant increases in the standard deduction and modifications to certain personal 
deductions provide further simplicity by greatly reducing the number of taxpayers 
who will itemize their deductions. . . .  The Act retains the most widely utilized 
itemized deductions, including deductions for home mortgage interest, state and local 
income taxes, real estate and personal property taxes, charitable contributions, 
casualty and theft losses, and medical expenses (above an increased floor). . . .  In 
addition to ensuring that high-income taxpayers pay their share of the Federal tax 
burden, the Act provides tax relief to low-and middle-income wage earners.  To 
achieve this goal, the Act substantially increases the standard deduction (the prior-law 
zero bracket amount) and almost doubles the personal exemption . . . to ensure that no 
families below the poverty level will have Federal income tax liability. 
Id. 
 199. See New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 
 200. See Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148-49 
(1974) (“The propriety of a deduction does not turn upon general equitable 
considerations, such as a demonstration of effective economic and practical 
equivalence.”). 
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diminishes by the amount of payroll, state and local income taxes 
assessed on this salary, as well as other expenses “ordinary and 
necessary” to earning this salary, such as commuting expenses.201  Thus, 
under the accession to wealth rule, the amount of gain that should be 
reported as gross income is the amount by which the employee’s salary 
exceeds these costs.  Congress should adopt provisions to recognize an 
“expenditure basis” in these costs and ensure that it taxes wages in parity 
with other sources of income. 
Assuming the entire amount of wages are receipts and not income, 
Congress can, and does, tax these receipts through the imposition of 
excise taxes.202  The FICA tax, for example, is an excise tax on the first 
$94,200 of wage receipts.203  Why, then, should Congress provide for 
the determination of wage income from wage receipts in light of this 
excise tax alternative?  For two reasons: (1) the income tax’s graduated 
rate structure, and (2) the Alternative Minimum Tax and phase-out of 
other deductions. 
1.  Graduated Structure of Income Tax Rates 
This Court’s rationale in Stewart is theoretically applicable to wage 
earners.204  A merchant’s sale of a good to a customer is economically 
indistinguishable from an employee’s “sale” of labor to his employer.  
Volume factors into calculating employee wages in a number of ways: 
hourly rates, commissions on sales, or bonuses calculated on the basis of 
working in excess of a fixed number of hours or number of deals closed 
in a year. 
Consider the following example.  Two employees, A and B, each 
earn $10 per hour.  A state law imposes a 10% tax on the first $300 of 
wages, and a 20% tax on the next $300 of wages.  In week 1, A works 
20 hours and B works 30 hours.  A earns $200 and pays $20 in taxes, 
 
 201. An argument can be made that wealth does not diminish because the state 
provides services in exchange for taxes paid.  While taxpayers may enjoy such benefits, 
they do not necessarily have an enforceable right to them vested to the extent that they 
should be considered an “accession to wealth.”  See generally, Calvin R. Massey, 
Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1996). 
 202. See discussion supra notes 69-71, 181 and 196. 
 203. I.R.C. § 3101.  The taxable amount of wages is schedule to increase to $97,500 
for 2007.  See “History of the OASDI contribution and benefit base,” available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/cbb.html; see also supra notes 181 and 196. 
 204. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text. 
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while B earns $300 and pays $30 in taxes.  In week 2, A and B each 
work an additional 10 hours—30 and 40 respectively.  A earns $300 and 
pays $30 in taxes.  B earns $400, but pays $50 in taxes.  While A and B 
each pay a $1 tax on their 30th hour of labor, B pays a $2 tax on his 31st 
hour.  B pays an additional 10% tax on each additional hour worked, 
essentially, according to Stewart, for engaging in a work hour “more 
often” than A—with no recognition of the incremental costs B incurs by 
working that additional hour.205
Consequently, the Court’s rationale in Stewart could theoretically 
limit Congress to assessing a uniform tax rate on wage receipts 
calculated on the basis of volume.  Where employees are paid a salary, 
however, Congress would still be free to impose a progressive rate 
excise tax, as clearly indicated in Magoun and Knowlton.206  Congress 
would thus need to establish a method to distinguish volume-based 
wages, yet should also anticipate a significant shift away from salaries to 
some type of volume-based wage structure. 
2.  Deductions, Exemptions, Phase-Outs 
and the Alternative Minimum Tax 
The Court’s decision in Stewart carried few implications for wages 
when the Court decided the case, as income tax exemptions were large 
enough at the time to compensate for the costs employees incurred.207  
The current Code likewise provides for numerous deductions and 
 
 205. See Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 566 (1935).  Volume also 
distorts income calculations if A and B earn different hourly rates.  For example, if A 
earned $15 per hour and B earned $10, each would pay $30 in taxes on $300 of wages, 
despite the fact that B had to work 10 additional hours for the additional $100. 
 206. See discussion supra notes 65 and 145. 
 207. See Geier, supra note 193, at 24. 
In 1939 (and, indeed, through 1949), the combined employer and employee Social 
Security tax was two percent (one percent each), which was imposed on wages up to 
$3,000.  Because of the generous personal exemptions under the income tax—$2,500 
for married couples and $1,000 for single taxpayers, along with $400 for each 
dependent, at a time when few households earned as much each year—the two-
percent payroll tax was the only tax paid by the vast majority of lower- and middle-
class workers. 
Id.  This contrasts sharply with 2004, where only 17.2% of taxpayers earning wages 
earned less than $10,000, and the standard deduction and personal exemptions were 
$4,850 and $3,100, respectively.  See IRS Statistics of Income Tax Stats, Individual 
Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report) (2004), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/id=134951,00.html. 
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exemptions from income.208  Some could argue that these provisions 
also function as an approximate209 calculation of income from receipts, 
to which a few observations are available in response.  First, while there 
are personal and dependency exemptions available to taxpayers, these 
amounts are far lower in proportion to wages than those of 1935, and do 
not have the same compensating effect.210  Second, the deductions and 
exemptions currently available are mostly for personal expenditures.211  
Certain deductions that would be considered wage expenditures are 
allowable, but only as itemized deductions.212  Third, to the extent 
deductions and exemptions are available, they are denied to many wage 
earners due to limitations such as phase-outs and the Alternative 
Minimum Tax.213  Itemized deductions are also subject to certain 
limitations.214  Since adjusted gross income is calculated before 
subtracting itemized deductions, phase-outs deny many wage earners the 
ability to deduct the wage expenditures that the Code actually allows.  
Furthermore, whereas other taxpayers’ adjusted gross income reflects 
their net income, eligibility for permitted deductions is determined by 
wage earners’ gross receipts.215  Both structural inequities are especially 
acute where adjusted gross income thresholds are exceeded because of 
an increased volume of labor.216  Finally, the Alternative Minimum Tax, 
a parallel mandatory maximum tax system, disallows deductions for 
wage expenditures when calculating alternative minimum taxable 
income.217
 208. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 209. See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co., 294 U.S. at 559-60 (Kentucky asserting that 
a gross receipts tax was a “rough and ready method of taxing gains” and a “less 
complicated and more convenient [method] of administration than an income tax”). 
 210. See discussion supra note 193; compare Geier, supra note 193, at 24 (reporting 
that by 1939, only about 5% of the population paid income taxes), with Individual 
Income Tax Returns Publication 1304, supra note 207 (publishing that in 2004, the IRS 
reported receiving 132.2 million tax returns, 67.9% of which paid income taxes). 
 211. See discussion supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 212. See discussion supra notes 183-84. 
 213. See discussion supra note 184. 
 214. Medical expenses are deductible only to the extent they exceed 7.5% of 
adjusted gross income.  I.R.C. § 213.  Other miscellaneous itemized deductions are 
subject to a 2% floor.  I.R.C. § 67. 
 215. See discussion supra notes 180-85. 
 216. See discussion supra notes 204-05. 
 217. I.R.C. § 56(b). 
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IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR A WAGE EXPENDITURE BASIS 
The preceding sections discussed why it is entirely proper for courts 
to play a role in interpreting tax laws and identified current issues with 
respect to wages in the context of Supreme Court precedent.  The 
discussion above demonstrates that tax laws should recognize and adjust 
for some form of wage expenditure; however, it is Congress, and not the 
courts, that must ultimately address how to recognize such a provision.  
This Part proposes the adoption of a “wage expenditure basis,” a concept 
that balances the notion of equity for wage earners with established 
federal policies and administrative convenience. 
A.  The Wage Expenditure Basis 
As discussed in Part II, basis is the mechanism by which the Code 
measures the costs of property.218  The Code also incorporates an 
“expenditure basis” for taxpayers who operate a trade or business to 
deduct from their gross receipts.219  This expenditure basis includes 
salary expenses, taxes, fees, rents, travel and other costs unrelated to 
property.220  A wage expenditure basis would operate in a similar 
fashion, i.e., a separate schedule on which wage earners calculate their 
“gross income from wages” from their “wage receipts.” 
The wage expenditure basis would be calculated by the following 
formula: 
 
 BBwe = [P + T + (Emw * 92.35%)] 
 
where: 
 BB
 
we = Wage expenditure basis; 
 P = Payroll taxes withheld; 
 T = State and local income taxes withheld; and 
 Emw = Minimum wage equivalent. 
 218. See discussion supra notes 173-75. 
 219. See discussion supra notes 176-78. 
 220. See discussion supra notes 177 and 182. 
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Gross income from wages would then be calculated as follows: 
 
 Iw = Wa – Bwe 
 
 where: 
 Iw = Gross income from wages; 
 Wa = Aggregate wage receipts; and 
 BBwe = Wage expenditure basis. 
1.  Taxes 
Payroll taxes and income taxes each qualify as expenses “ordinary 
and necessary . . . in carrying on any trade or business.”221  The costs to 
employees for these items increase in direct proportion to the amount of 
wages earned.  The Code, however, expressly disallows deductions for 
employee payroll taxes,222 and state and local taxes are available only as 
itemized deductions.223  The wage expenditure basis recognizes these 
significant costs to all employees without imposing an additional 
administrative burden on the government.  These items are each reported 
on Form W-2, which is available to both employees and tax 
authorities.224  While each employee taxpayer’s state and local tax 
liability may vary from the amounts actually withheld from wages, these 
taxpayers can include refunds as income and deduct additional payments 
on the subsequent year’s wage expenditure basis schedule.225
2.  The Minimum Wage Equivalent 
The minimum wage equivalent concept allows Congress to assign a 
base value to the employee taxpayer’s labor, recognize variations in the 
amount of time worked, and account for other miscellaneous costs of 
labor in an administratively convenient way.  The federal minimum 
wage represents Congress’s determination of the amount of income 
 
 221. See discussion supra notes 177 and 182. 
 222. I.R.C. § 275. 
 223. I.R.C. § 164. 
 224. Employers send end of year W-2 forms to their employees as well as to the IRS 
and state tax authorities. 
 225. Such an approach would be consistent with current practice.  State and local 
income tax refunds are includible in gross income in the year received under the Tax 
Benefit Rule.  See I.R.C. § 111. 
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necessary to maintain “the minimum standard of living necessary for the 
health, efficiency, and general-well-being of workers.”226  Congress thus 
frustrates its labor policy through its tax policy by imposing income 
taxes on employees who earn the minimum wage.  By providing a 
deduction on the basis of the minimum wage the employee would have 
earned for the work performed, the Code would truly embody a policy 
of taxing “gains” derived from labor, while Congress would move 
further toward its stated goal of ensuring a minimum standard of living 
for low-income workers by exempting minimum wage earners from 
income tax.227
The minimum wage equivalent is also administratively convenient.  
Congress could reasonably conclude, for example, that when it sets the 
minimum wage rate, it takes into account the various incidental costs of 
earning wages, such as commuting and meals.  The minimum wage 
equivalent thus operates as a “catch-all” exclusion, eliminating the need 
to provide a detailed itemization of varied miscellaneous costs, and 
ensuring simplicity for taxpayers and tax agencies alike. 
Furthermore, the minimum wage equivalent eliminates the bias 
against taxpayers who earn higher wages by working longer hours.  
Employees who are compensated on the basis of volume would deduct a 
minimum wage equivalent calculated on such basis.  Without adjusting 
for quantity of work, an employee who works 30 hours a week yet earns 
less per hour could pay higher income taxes than an employee who 
works 20 hours per week yet earns more per hour.228  With the minimum 
wage equivalent, the employee working 30 hours per week and paid 
hourly subtracts a larger minimum wage equivalent than the employee 
 226. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202 [hereinafter “FLSA”].  A number of 
states have minimum wage laws requiring higher compensation than that of FLSA.  See 
Minimum Wage Laws in the States—January 1, 2007, http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage 
/america.htm.  Congress could allow a deduction for these amounts, thus deferring to 
state determinations of minimum standards of living, or it could use the federal 
minimum wage for the sake of simplicity.  The same administrative convenience also 
makes a federal minimum wage equivalent more advantageous than unemployment 
compensation, which also varies by state.  Unemployment compensation may be more 
doctrinally “pure” to the extent that it represents value that accrues to a wage earner 
who does not engage in any labor, and any wages in excess of this amount would be—
literally—“gains from labor.” 
 227. By imposing taxes only on the gains that accrue to taxpayers after providing for 
“minimum living standards.”  See 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
 228. See example supra note 205. 
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working 20 hours per week, and their tax liability adjusts accordingly.229  
Employees paid a salary, by contrast, could deduct the equivalent of 40 
hours per week, the standard workweek under the FLSA.230
Minimum wage earners also currently pay payroll taxes of 7.65% 
under FICA.231  The wage expenditure basis formula adjusts the 
minimum wage equivalent to 92.35% of the minimum wage payable 
because the entire amount of payroll taxes withheld is also excluded.232
3.  The Impact of the Wage Expenditure Basis 
The wage expenditure basis adjusts wages for the costs employees 
incur in earning them.  This concept is consistent with the accession to 
wealth rule because employees’ wealth increases by their net wages.  
Tax withholdings, for instance, are neither realized nor subject to an 
employee’s complete dominion, as understood within the context of 
Glenshaw Glass.  The minimum wage equivalent, though possibly 
greater than the costs some employees would incur, strikes the 
appropriate balance between the equity in recognizing these costs and 
the need to minimize the administrative burden in so doing. 
Congress could adopt the wage expenditure basis with minimal 
impact on the statutory framework of the Code.  Ultimately, the wage 
 
 229. The minimum wage equivalent would allow each earner to subtract their wage 
expenditure basis and report only their “gains” from wages as gross income.  Thus, in 
the example in note 205, supra, A and B’s minimum wage equivalent would be $95.12 
and $142.68, respectively.  Their gross income from wages would be $181.93 and 
$134.37, respectively.  For a similar reason, the minimum wage equivalent concept 
would also alleviate the inequity of the marriage penalty, the repeal of which is 
scheduled to expire in 2010.  In two-earner families, the second earner’s first dollar of 
income is taxed at the marginal tax rate of the first earner’s last dollar of income.  The 
minimum wage equivalent could also obviate the need for personal exemptions for each 
worker, while continuing to allow for dependency exemptions, which could still be 
phased-out for high-income workers. 
 230. Employees with a portion of their compensation calculated on the basis of time, 
such as bonuses in excess of a minimum hour threshold, could also deduct the hourly 
equivalent of their work since there would be evidence provided by employers of hours 
worked. 
 231. See supra note 181. 
 232. These adjustments thus continue Congress’s policy of disallowing “double 
deductions.”  See I.R.C. § 62 (“Nothing in this section shall permit the same item to be 
deducted more than once.”).  State and local income taxes did not significantly affect 
this percentage, and thus were excluded from the minimum wage equivalent 
adjustment. 
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expenditure basis would: (1) require a new schedule similar to Schedule 
C or Schedule E, (2) add two new exclusions from income—payroll 
taxes and the minimum wage equivalent, and (3) reclassify the itemized 
deductions for state and local income taxes as an exclusion on this new 
schedule.  The wage expenditure basis would make the Code far more 
progressive and Congress could also offset the cost of correcting these 
structural inequities by adjusting marginal tax rates accordingly.233  
Congress would also be free to continue its practice of allowing 
additional personal deductions both above and below the line to support 
worthwhile public policies, subject to the same adjusted gross income 
ceilings, phase-outs and inclusions under the Alternative Minimum Tax.  
Each increase in the minimum wage would carry greater economic 
effect, as workers would receive each additional dollar tax-free.  Finally, 
each minimum wage increase would also operate as an income tax 
reduction, and Congress would no longer “stand on both sides” of the 
transaction by voting itself more tax revenue with each additional 
increase in the minimum wage.234
V.  CONCLUSION 
As of this writing, it is not yet known how Murphy will finally be 
resolved.  The original panel’s decision to vacate and rehear the case is 
just one of many unexpected developments in Ms. Murphy’s long quest 
for her refund.  This unusual move places the panel in an interesting 
position.  The panel can reaffirm a controversial and widely criticized 
decision, strengthened by a more comprehensive constitutional analysis 
 233. Taxpayers earning less than $10,712 would not need to file at all (assuming a 
minimum wage of $5.15, a 40-hour week and a 52-week year). 
 234. The current proposal to raise the minimum wage to $7.25 would, if passed, 
reduce each taxpayer’s taxable income by an average $4,368 (based on a 40-hour week 
and a 52-week year) using the minimum wage equivalent.  When Congress raises the 
minimum wage, it is requiring third parties—employers—to increase the amount of 
wages paid to employees.  Congress directly benefits from increased income and 
payroll tax revenue.  The structural design of the minimum wage equivalent eliminates 
this benefit.  Under analogous circumstances in corporate law, when a corporation’s 
board of directors engages in self-dealing, courts review such transactions under a more 
stringent standard.  See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) 
(applying the test of intrinsic fairness to a self-dealing transaction); see also Weinberger 
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (“When directors of a . . . corporation are on 
both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and 
the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”). 
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and free of the original opinion’s mistakes.  In so doing, the panel risks 
reversal either en banc or by the Supreme Court.  Alternatively, the 
panel could reverse itself, avoiding the controversy and criticism, yet 
risking public perception that the panel is vulnerable to both.  The 
unpredictable history of this case undermines the utility of predictions; I 
will note only that the panel could have achieved the latter result without 
risking the negative consequences by allowing the case to proceed en 
banc.  The panel will hear oral arguments on April 23, 2007. 
Whatever the ultimate outcome, the D.C. Circuit provided a public 
service by reminding Congress of the difference between receipts and 
income.  Courts do not often have the opportunity to make this 
distinction, but they have recognized it, and Murphy will hopefully serve 
to remind legislatures of their obligation to do so as well.  Going 
forward, Congress should ensure that the Internal Revenue Code taxes 
gains, not receipts. 
Where the Code may have at one time taxed wages at a level where 
the distinction between revenues and income was largely an academic 
question, today the distinction is very real to taxpayers.  Congress now 
taxes a greater proportion of wage earners as well as a larger proportion 
of the wages they earn.  At the same time, wage earners bear increasing 
costs of employment.  The wage expenditure basis proposed in this 
article seeks to resolve the disparity between the taxation of wages and 
the taxation of other forms of income, and succeeds in a way that is 
faithful to the notions of equity, progressivity and simplicity. 
 
